The following Maxims of common human Understanding do not properly come in here, as parts of the Critique of Taste; but yet they may serve to elucidate its fundamental propositions. They are: 1° to think for oneself; 2° to put ourselves in thought in the place of every one else; 3° always to think consistently. The first is the maxim of _unprejudiced_ thought; the second of _enlarged_ thought; the third of _consecutive_ thought.[72] The first is the maxim of a Reason never _passive_. The tendency to such passivity, and therefore to heteronomy of the Reason, is called _prejudice_; and the greatest prejudice of all is to represent nature as not subject to the rules that the Understanding places at its basis by means of its own essential law, _i.e._ is _superstition_. Deliverance from superstition is called _enlightenment_;[73] because although this name belongs to deliverance from prejudices in general, yet superstition specially (_in sensu eminenti_) deserves to be called a prejudice. For the blindness in which superstition places us, which it even imposes on us as an obligation, makes the need of being guided by others, and the consequent passive state of our Reason, peculiarly noticeable. As regards the second maxim of the mind, we are otherwise wont to call him limited (_borné_, the opposite of _enlarged_) whose talents attain to no great use (especially as regards intensity). But here we are not speaking of the faculty of cognition, but of the _mode of thought_ which makes a purposive use thereof. However small may be the area or the degree to which a man’s natural gifts reach, yet it indicates a man of _enlarged thought_ if he disregards the subjective private conditions of his own judgement, by which so many others are confined, and reflects upon it from a _universal standpoint_ (which he can only determine by placing himself at the standpoint of others). The third maxim, viz. that of _consecutive_ thought, is the most difficult to attain, and can only be attained by the combination of both the former, and after the constant observance of them has grown into a habit. We may say that the first of these maxims is the maxim of Understanding, the second of Judgement, and the third of Reason. I take up again the threads interrupted by this digression, and I say that Taste can be called _sensus communis_ with more justice than sound Understanding can; and that the aesthetical Judgement rather than the intellectual may bear the name of a communal sense,[74] if we are willing to use the word “sense” of an effect of mere reflection upon the mind: for then we understand by sense the feeling of pleasure. We could even define Taste as the faculty of judging of that which makes _universally communicable_, without the mediation of a concept, our feeling in a given representation.