The skill that men have in communicating their thoughts requires also a relation between the Imagination and the Understanding in order to associate intuitions with concepts, and concepts again with those concepts, which then combine in a cognition. But in that case the agreement of the two mental powers is _according to law_, under the constraint of definite concepts. Only where the Imagination in its freedom awakens the Understanding, and is put by it into regular play without the aid of concepts, does the representation communicate itself not as a thought but as an internal feeling of a purposive state of the mind. Taste is then the faculty of judging _a priori_ of the communicability of feelings that are bound up with a given representation (without the mediation of a concept). If we could assume that the mere universal communicability of a feeling must carry in itself an interest for us with it (which, however, we are not justified in concluding from the character of a merely reflective Judgement), we should be able to explain why the feeling in the judgement of taste comes to be imputed to every one, so to speak, as a duty. § 41. _Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful_ That the judgement of taste by which something is declared beautiful must have no interest _as its determining ground_ has been sufficiently established above. But it does not follow that after it has been given as a pure aesthetical judgement, no interest can be combined with it. This combination, however, can only be indirect, _i.e._ taste must first of all be represented as combined with something else, in order that we may unite with the satisfaction of mere reflection upon an object a _pleasure in its existence_ (as that wherein all interest consists). For here also in aesthetical judgements what we say in cognitive judgements (of things in general) is valid; _a posse ad esse non valet consequentia_. This something else may be empirical, viz. an inclination proper to human nature, or intellectual, as the property of the Will of being capable of _a priori_ determination by Reason. Both these involve a satisfaction in the presence of an Object, and so can lay the foundation for an interest in what has by itself pleased without reference to any interest whatever. Empirically the Beautiful interests only in _society_. If we admit the impulse to society as natural to man, and his fitness for it, and his propension towards it, _i.e._ _sociability_, as a requisite for man as a being destined for society, and so as a property belonging to _humanity_, we cannot escape from regarding taste as a faculty for judging everything in respect of which we can communicate our _feeling_ to all other men, and so as a means of furthering that which every one’s natural inclination desires.