As for the two antinomies of the theoretical and practical employment of the superior cognitive faculties, we have already shown their _unavoidableness_, if judgements of this kind are not referred to a supersensible substrate of the given Objects, as phenomena; and also the _possibility of their solution_, as soon as this is done. And as for the antinomies in the employment of the Judgement, in conformity with the requirements of Reason, and their solution which is here given, there are only two ways of avoiding them. _Either_: we must deny that any _a priori_ principle lies at the basis of the aesthetical judgement of taste; we must maintain that all claim to necessary universal agreement is a groundless and vain fancy, and that a judgement of taste only deserves to be regarded as correct because _it happens_ that many people agree about it; and this, not because we _assume_ an _a priori_ principle behind this agreement, but because (as in the taste of the palate) of the contingent similar organisation of the different subjects. _Or_: we must assume that the judgement of taste is really a disguised judgement of Reason upon the perfection discovered in a thing and the reference of the manifold in it to a purpose, and is consequently only called aesthetical on account of the confusion here attaching to our reflection, although it is at bottom teleological. In the latter case we could declare the solution of the antinomies by means of transcendental Ideas to be needless and without point, and thus could harmonise these laws of taste with Objects of sense, not as mere phenomena but as things in themselves. But we have shown in several places in the exposition of judgements of taste how little either of these expedients will satisfy. However, if it be granted that our deduction at least proceeds by the right method, although it be not yet plain enough in all its parts, three Ideas manifest themselves. _First_, there is the Idea of the supersensible in general, without any further determination of it, as the substrate of nature. _Secondly_, there is the Idea of the same as the principle of the subjective purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculty. And _thirdly_, there is the Idea of the same as the principle of the purposes of freedom, and of the agreement of freedom with its purposes in the moral sphere. § 58. _Of the Idealism of the purposiveness of both Nature and Art as the unique principle of the aesthetical Judgement_