To begin with, we can either place the principle of taste in the fact that it always judges in accordance with grounds which are empirical and therefore are only given _a posteriori_ by sense, or concede that it judges on _a priori_ grounds. The former would be the _empiricism_ of the Critique of Taste; the latter its _rationalism_. According to the _former_ the Object of our satisfaction would not differ from the _pleasant_; according to the latter, if the judgement rests on definite concepts, it would not differ from the _good_. Thus all _beauty_ would be banished from the world, and only a particular name, expressing perhaps a certain mingling of the two above-named kinds of satisfaction, would remain in its place. But we have shown that there are also _a priori_ grounds of satisfaction which can subsist along with the principle of rationalism, although they cannot be comprehended in _definite concepts_. On the other hand, the rationalism of the principle of taste is either that of the _realism_ of the purposiveness, or of its _idealism_. Because a judgement of taste is not a cognitive judgement, and beauty is not a characteristic of the Object, considered in itself, the rationalism of the principle of taste can never be placed in the fact that the purposiveness in this judgement is thought as objective, _i.e._ that the judgement theoretically, and therefore also logically (although only in a confused way), refers to the perfection of the Object. It only refers _aesthetically_ to the agreement of the representation of the Object in the Imagination with the essential principles of Judgement in general in the subject. Consequently, even according to the principle of rationalism, the judgement of taste and the distinction between its realism and idealism can only be settled thus. Either in the first case, this subjective purposiveness is assumed as an actual (designed) _purpose_ of nature (or art) harmonising with our Judgement; or, in the second case, as a purposive harmony with the needs of Judgement, in respect of nature and its forms produced according to particular laws, which shows itself, without purpose, spontaneously, and contingently.