Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics — Kant — John Shaqi
Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Kant · en
Metaphysical judgments, properly so called, are all synthetical. We
must distinguish judgments pertaining to metaphysics from metaphysical
judgments properly so called. Many of the former are analytical, but
they only afford the means for metaphysical judgments, which are the
whole end of the science, and which are always synthetical. For if
there be concepts pertaining to metaphysics (as, for example, that of
substance), the judgments springing from simple analysis of them also
pertain to metaphysics, as, for example, substance is that which only
exists as subject; and by means of several such analytical judgments,
we seek to approach the definition of the concept. But as the analysis
of a pure concept of the understanding pertaining to metaphysics, does
not proceed in any different manner from the dissection of any other,
even empirical, concepts, not pertaining to metaphysics (such as: air
is an elastic fluid, the elasticity of which is not destroyed by any
known degree of cold), it follows that the concept indeed, but not the
analytical judgment, is properly metaphysical. This science has
something peculiar in the production of its a priori cognitions, which
must therefore be distinguished from the features it has in common
with other rational knowledge. Thus the judgment, that all the
substance in things is permanent, is a synthetical and properly
metaphysical judgment.
If the a priori principles, which constitute the materials of
metaphysics, have first been collected according to fixed principles,
then their analysis will be of great value; it might be taught as a
particular part (as a philosophia definitiva), containing nothing but
analytical judgments pertaining to metaphysics, and could be treated
separately from the synthetical which constitute metaphysics proper.
For indeed these analyses are not elsewhere of much value, except in
metaphysics, i.e., as regards the synthetical judgments, which are to
be generated by these previously analysed concepts.
The conclusion drawn in this section then is, that metaphysics is
properly concerned with synethetical propositions a priori, and these
alone constitute its end, for which it indeed requires various
dissections of its concepts, viz., of its analytical judgments, but
wherein the procedure is not different from that in every other kind
of knowledge, in which we merely seek to render our concepts distinct
by analysis. But the generation of a priori cognition by concrete
images as well as by concepts, in fine of synthetical propositions a
priori in philosophical cognition, constitutes the essential subject
of Metaphysics.