Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics — Kant — John Shaqi
Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Kant · en
Should my reader complain of the difficulty and the trouble which I
occasion him in the solution of this problem, he is at liberty to
solve it himself in an easier way. Perhaps he will then feel under
obligation to the person who has undertaken for him a labor of so
profound research, and will rather be surprised at the facility with
which, considering the nature of the subject, the solution has been
attained. Yet it has cost years of work to solve the problem in its
whole universality (using the term in the mathematical sense, viz.,
for that which is sufficient for all cases), and finally to exhibit it
in the analytical form, as the reader finds it here.
All metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended from
their occupations till they shall have answered in a satisfactory
manner the question, "How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?"
For the answer contains which they must show when they have anything
to offer in the name of pure reason. But if they do not possess these
credentials, they can expect nothing else of reasonable people, who
have been deceived so often, than to be dismissed without further ado.
If they on the other hand desire to carry on their business, not as a
science, but as an art of wholesome oratory suited to the common sense
of man, they cannot in justice be prevented. They will then speak the
modest language of a rational belief, they will grant that they are
not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, anything which lies
beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not
for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical
purposes only) the existence of something that is possible and even
indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in
life. In this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and
the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysicians; for the
latter profess to be speculative philosophers, and since, when
judgments a priori are under discussion, poor probabilities cannot be
admitted (for what is declared to be known a priori is thereby
announced as necessary), such men cannot be permitted to play with
conjectures, but their assertions must be either science, or are worth
nothing at all.