Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics — Kant — John Shaqi
Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Kant · en
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{15} But how does this proposition, "that judgments of experience
contain necessity in the synthesis of perceptions," agree with my
statement so often before inculcated, that "experience as cognition a
posteriori can afford contingent judgments only?" When I say that
experience teaches me something, I mean only the perception that lies
in experience,—for example, that heat always follows the shining of
the sun on a stone; consequently the proposition of experience is
always so far accidental. That this heat necessarily follows the
shining of the sun is contained indeed in the judgment of experience
(by means of the concept of cause), yet is a fact not learned by
experience; for conversely, experience is first of all generated by
this addition of the concept of the understanding (of cause) to
perception. How perception attains this addition may be seen by
referring in the Critique itself to the section on the Transcendental
faculty of Judgment [viz., in the first edition, Von dem Schematismus
der reinen Verstandsbegriffe].
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§ 23. Judgments, when considered merely as the condition of the
union of given representations in a consciousness, are rules. These
rules, so far as they represent the union as necessary, are rules a
priori, and so far as they cannot be deduced from higher rules, are
fundamental principles. But in regard to the possibility of all
experience, merely in relation to the form of thinking in it, no
conditions of judgments of experience are higher than those which
bring the phenomena, according to the various form of their intuition,
under pure concepts of the understanding, and render the empirical
judgment objectively valid. These concepts are therefore the a priori
principles of possible experience.
The principles of possible experience are then at the same time
universal laws of nature, which can be cognised a priori. And thus the
problem in our second question, "How is the pure Science of Nature
possible?" is solved. For the system which is required for the form of
a science is to be met with in perfection here, because, beyond the
above-mentioned formal conditions of all judgments in general offered
in logic, no others are possible, and these constitute a logical
system. The concepts grounded thereupon, which contain the a priori
conditions of all synthetical and necessary judgments, accordingly
constitute a transcendental system. Finally the principles, by means
of which all phenomena are subsumed under these concepts, constitute a
physical{16} system, that is, a system of nature, which precedes all
empirical cognition of nature, makes it even possible, and hence may
in strictness be denominated the universal and pure science of nature.