Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics — Kant — John Shaqi
Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Kant · en
Many a naturalist of pure reason (by which I mean the man who believes
he can decide in matters of metaphysics without any science) may
pretend, that he long ago by the prophetic spirit of his sound sense,
not only suspected, but knew and comprehended, what is here propounded
with so much ado, or, if he likes, with prolix and pedantic pomp:
"that with all our reason we can never reach beyond the field of
experience." But when he is questioned about his rational principles
individually, he must grant, that there are many of them which he has
not taken from experience, and which are therefore independent of it
and valid a priori. How then and on what grounds will he restrain both
himself and the dogmatist, who makes use of these concepts and
principles beyond all possible experience, because they are recognised
to be independent of it? And even he, this adept in sound sense, in
spite of all his assumed and cheaply acquired wisdom, is not exempt
from wandering inadvertently beyond objects of experience into the
field of chimeras. He is often deeply enough involved in them, though
in announcing everything as mere probability, rational conjecture, or
analogy, he gives by his popular language a color to his groundless
pretensions.
§ 32. Since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers into pure reason
have conceived, besides the things of sense, or appearances
(phenomena), which make up the sensible world, certain creations of
the understanding (Verstandeswesen), called noumena, which should
constitute an intelligible world. And as appearance and illusion were
by those men identified (a thing which we may well excuse in an
undeveloped epoch), actuality was only conceded to the creations of
thought.
And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere
appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in
itself, though we know not this thing in its internal constitution,
but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are
affected by this unknown something. The understanding therefore, by
assuming appearances, grants the existence of things in themselves
also, and so far we may say, that the representation of such things as
form the basis of phenomena, consequently of mere creations of the
understanding, is not only admissible, but unavoidable.