Kant's arguments to show that our apprehension of space belongs to perception are two in number, and both are directed to show not, as they should, that space is a _form_ of perception, but that it is a _perception_.[21] The first runs thus: "Space is no discursive, or, as we say, general conception of relations of things in general, but a pure perception. For, in the first place, we can represent to ourselves only one space, and if we speak of many spaces we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space. Again, these parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space as the component parts, as it were, out of which it can be composed, but can be thought only in it. Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and consequently the general conception of spaces in general, rests solely upon limitations."[22] [21] Kant uses the phrase 'pure perception'; but 'pure' can only mean 'not containing sensation', and consequently adds nothing relevant. [22] B. 39, M. 24. The concluding sentences of the paragraph need not be considered. Here Kant is clearly taking the proper test of perception. Its object, as being an individual, is unique; there is only one of it, whereas any conception has a plurality of instances. But he reaches his conclusion by supposing that we first perceive empty space and then become aware of its parts by dividing it. Parts of space are essentially limitations of the one space; therefore to apprehend them we must first apprehend space. And since space is _one_, it must be object of perception; in other words, space, in the sense of the one all-embracing space, i. e. the totality of individual spaces, is something perceived. The argument appears open to two objections. In the _first_ place, we do _not_ perceive space as a whole, and then, by dividing it, come to apprehend individual spaces. We perceive individual spaces, or, rather, individual bodies occupying individual spaces.[23] We then apprehend that these spaces, as spaces, involve an infinity of other spaces. In other words, it is reflection on the general nature of space, the apprehension of which is involved in our apprehension of individual spaces or rather of bodies in space, which gives rise to the apprehension of the totality[24] of spaces, the apprehension being an act, not of perception, but of thought or conception. It is necessary, then, to distinguish (_a_) individual spaces, which we perceive; (_b_) the nature of space in general, of which we become aware by reflecting upon the character of perceived individual spaces, and which we conceive; (_c_) the totality of individual spaces, the thought of which we reach by considering the nature of space in general.