Of the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books: From: Essays and Treaties on Moral, Political and various Philosophical Subjects — Kant — John Shaqi
Of the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books: From: Essays and Treaties on Moral, Political and various Philosophical Subjects
Kant · en
The question remains still to be answered: since the editor projects
to the public the ownership over the work of the author, does not the
consent of the editor (and by implication also the author, who gave
the editor legal control over it) to every use of the work, including
reprinting it, result automatically from ownership of a copy of the
work, such that such consent is automatically furnished to whoever
purchases a copy of the work, however disagreeable such consent to
permit counterfeiting may be to the editor? For the prospect of profit
has perhaps enticed the editor to undertake, with the risk of having
the published work counterfeited, the business of editor, where this
risk is more likely since the purchaser has not been excluded from
counterfeiting via an express contract, because it would hurt the
editor's business if the editor tried to obligate all potential
purchasers of the work to agree to a contract forbidding
counterfeiting, because potential purchases would generally not
consent to such an agreement and therefore would be less likely to
purchase a copy of the work. My answer to this question is that the
ownership of the copy does not furnish the right of counterfeiting. I
prove this by the following ratiocination:
A personal positive right against another can never be
derived from the ownership of a thing only.
But the right of publishing a work is a personal positive right.
Therefore, the right of publishing never can be derived from the
ownership of a thing (the copy) only.
Proof of the Major
With the ownership of a thing is indeed accompanied the negative right
to resist any one who would hinder me from the use of it at pleasure;
but a positive right against a person, to demand of him to perform
something or to be obliged to serve me in anything, cannot arise from
the mere ownership of a thing. It is true this positive right might by
a particular agreement be added to the purchase contract whereby I
acquire a property from anybody; e.g. that, when I purchase a
commodity, the seller shall also send it to a certain place free from
expenses. But then the right against the person, to do something for
me, does not proceed from the mere ownership of my purchased thing,
but from a particular contract.
Proof of the Minor