Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay — Kant — John Shaqi
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay
Kant · en
These politicians, instead of adopting an open, straightforward way
of doing things (as they boast), mix themselves up in intrigue. They
get at the authorities in power and say what will please them;
their sole bent is to sacrifice the nation, or even, if they can,
the whole world, with the one end in view that their own private
interest may be forwarded. This is the manner of regular jurists (I
mean the journeyman lawyer not the legislator), when they aspire to
politics. For, as it is not their business to reason too nicely over
legislation, but only to enforce the laws of the country, every legal
constitution in its existing form and, when this is changed by the
proper authorities, the one which takes its place, will always seem
to them the best possible. And the consequence is that everything
is purely mechanical. But this adroitness in suiting themselves
to any circumstances may lead them to the delusion that they are
also capable of giving an opinion about the principles of political
constitutions in general, in so far as they conform to ideas of
right, and are therefore not empirical, but _a priori_. And they may
therefore brag about their knowledge of men,—which indeed one expects
to find, since they have to deal with so many—without really knowing
the nature of man and what can be made of it, to gain which knowledge
a higher standpoint of anthropological observation than theirs is
required. Filled with ideas of this kind, if they trespass outside
their own sphere on the boundaries of political and international
law, looked upon as ideals which reason holds before us, they can
do so only in the spirit of chicanery. For they will follow their
usual method of making everything conform mechanically to compulsory
laws despotically made and enforced, even here, where the ideas of
reason recognise the validity of a legal compulsory force, only when
it is in accordance with the principles of freedom through which a
permanently valid constitution becomes first of all possible. The
would-be practical man, leaving out of account this idea of reason,
thinks that he can solve this problem empirically by looking to the
way in which those constitutions which have best survived the test
of time were established, even although the spirit of these may have
been generally contrary to the idea of right. The principles which
he makes use of here, although indeed he does not make them public,
amount pretty much to the following sophistical maxims.