See also Hume (_Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,_ Sect. III. Part I.). “This _poetical_ fiction of the _golden age_ is, in some respects, of a piece with the _philosophical_ fiction of the _state of nature_; only that the former is represented as the most charming and most peaceable condition, which can possibly be imagined; whereas the latter is painted out as a state of mutual war and violence, attended with the most extreme necessity.” This fiction of a state of nature as a state of war, says Hume, (in a note to this passage) is not the invention of Hobbes. Plato (_Republic_, II. III. IV.) refutes a hypothesis very like it, and Cicero (_Pro Sext._ l. 42) regards it as a fact universally acknowledged. Cf. also Spinoza (_Tract. Pol._ c. ii. § 14): “Homines ex natura hostes.” And (c. v. § 2): “Homines civiles non nascuntur sed fiunt.” These expressions are to be understood, says Bluntschli (_Theory of the State_, IV. Ch. vi., p. 284, _note_ a), “rather as a logical statement of what _would be_ the condition of man apart from civil society, than as distinctly implying a historical theory.” While starting from the same premises, Spinoza carries Hobbes’ political theories to their logical conclusion. If we admit that right lies with might, then right is with the people in any revolution successfully carried out. (But see Hobbes’ Preface to the _Philosophical Rudiments_ and Kant’s _Perpetual Peace_, p. 188, _note_.) Spinoza, in a letter, thus alludes to this point of difference:—“As regards political theories, the difference which you inquire about between Hobbes and myself, consists in this, that I always preserve natural right intact, and only allot to the chief magistrates in every state a right over their subjects commensurate with the excess of their power over the power of the subjects. This is what always takes place in the state of nature.” (Epistle 50, _Works_, Bohn’s ed., Vol. II.) These precautions secure that relative peace within the state which is one of the conditions of the safety of the people. But it is, besides, the duty of a sovereign to guarantee an adequate protection to his subjects against foreign enemies. A state of defence as complete and perfect as possible is not only a national duty, but an absolute necessity. The following statement of the relation of the state to other states shows how closely Hobbes has been followed by Kant. “There are two things necessary,” says Hobbes, (_On Dominion_, Ch. XIII. 7) “for the people’s defence; to be warned and to be forearmed. _For the state of commonwealths considered in themselves, is natural, that is to say, hostile._[49] Neither, if they cease from fighting, is it therefore to be called peace; but rather a breathing time, in which one enemy observing the motion and countenance of the other, values his security not according to pacts, but the forces and counsels of his adversary.”