The Critique of Practical Reason

Kant · en
These categories of freedom- for so we choose to call them in
contrast to those theoretic categories which are categories of
physical nature- have an obvious advantage over the latter, inasmuch
as the latter are only forms of thought which designate objects in
an indefinite manner by means of universal concept of every possible
intuition; the former, on the contrary, refer to the determination
of a free elective will (to which indeed no exactly corresponding
intuition can be assigned, but which has as its foundation a pure
practical a priori law, which is not the case with any concepts
belonging to the theoretic use of our cognitive faculties); hence,
instead of the form of intuition (space and time), which does not
lie in reason itself, but has to be drawn from another source, namely,
the sensibility, these being elementary practical concepts have as
their foundation the form of a pure will, which is given in reason
and, therefore, in the thinking faculty itself. From this it happens
that as all precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the
determination of the will, not with the physical conditions (of
practical ability) of the execution of one's purpose, the practical
a priori principles in relation to the supreme principle of freedom
are at once cognitions, and have not to wait for intuitions in order
to acquire significance, and that for this remarkable reason,
because they themselves produce the reality of that to which they
refer (the intention of the will), which is not the case with
theoretical concepts. Only we must be careful to observe that these
categories only apply to the practical reason; and thus they proceed
in order from those which are as yet subject to sensible conditions
and morally indeterminate to those which are free from sensible
conditions and determined merely by the moral law.



Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to the Notions of Good
and Evil.



                   I. QUANTITY.

                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 20}

 Subjective, according to maxims (practical opinions of the

   individual)

 Objective, according to principles (Precepts)

 A priori both objective and subjective principles of freedom

   (laws)

                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 25}



                   II. QUALITY.

 Practical rules of action (praeceptivae)

 Practical rules of omission (prohibitivae)

 Practical rules of exceptions (exceptivae)

                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 30}



                   III. RELATION.

 To personality

 To the condition of the person.

 Reciprocal, of one person to the others of the others.



                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 35}

                    IV. MODALITY.

 The Permitted and the Forbidden

 Duty and the contrary to duty.

 Perfect and imperfect duty.



                                          {BOOK_1|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 40}