The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant — Kant — John Shaqi
The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant
Kant · en
We can see now what Kant means by saying that time and space are
empirically real and transcendentally ideal. Kant does not maintain
that space and time are illusions. They are a constant element of what
is given us in perception. It is only when we try and go beyond our
perceptions, and take space and time as things existing independently of
what we perceive, thus trying to transcend the limits of possible
perception, that we fall into illusion. Space and time have meaning
only as elements in what we perceive, or in connecting what we perceive
now with what we may perceive.
*CHAPTER IV*
*THE CATEGORIES AND THE PRINCIPLES OF PURE UNDERSTANDING*
Kant makes the distinction between perception and understanding depend
upon the distinction between the receptivity and the spontaneity of the
mind. In the _Æsthetic_ he has been concerned with time and space as
elements in what seems to be given to the mind. Before we begin to ask
the questions of science, before we analyse, describe, or classify,
before we have to think, we perceive. Time and space are not got at by
thinking or generalisation. For before we can say anything about any
part of our experience, it is _given_ us in a certain spatial and
temporal order. If we open our eyes at any moment, we are, without any
conscious effort of thought on our part, confronted with an elaborate
content. It seems simple to distinguish this receptive attitude of the
mind in perception from its activity in thinking.
The distinction is not really so simple as it appears. For we all know
that what we perceive depends, at least to some extent, on the mind’s
activity. We are familiar with the reflection that men see what they
want to see or what they are looking for. This is clearly shown in the
case of hearing by the difference in what we hear when we are listening
to a language we understand and when we are listening to an unfamiliar
language, or in the common experience when, after failing to hear what
someone has said, we think what it must have been, and then seem to
recall the sound, not as we heard it, but as we should have heard it if
we had heard it rightly. Anyone who reflects on the process of fast
reading will realise that we do not perceive or notice all the letters
on a page; we fill in from our imagination, as we discover when we read
words that are not on the page. It is a very hard thing, giving up all
interpretation and inference, to describe faithfully just what is there
to see.