An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 — John Locke — John Shaqi
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
John Locke · en
For though the comprehension of our understandings comes exceeding
short of the vast extent of things, yet we shall have cause enough to
magnify the bountiful Author of our being, for that proportion and
degree of knowledge he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of
the inhabitants of this our mansion. Men have reason to be well
satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, since he hath given
them (as St. Peter says) [words in Greek], whatsoever is necessary for
the conveniences of life and information of virtue; and has put within
the reach of their discovery, the comfortable provision for this life,
and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge
may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it
yet secures their great concernments, that they have light enough to
lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own
duties. Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads, and employ
their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not
boldly quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the
blessings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough
to grasp everything. We shall not have much reason to complain of the
narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be
of use to us; for of that they are very capable. And it will be an
unpardonable, as well as childish peevishness, if we undervalue the
advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for
which it was given us, because there are some things that are set out
of the reach of it. It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward
servant, who would not attend his business by candle light, to plead
that he had not broad sunshine. The Candle that is set up in us shines
bright enough for all our purposes. The discoveries we can make with
this ought to satisfy us; and we shall then use our understandings
right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that
they are suited to our faculties, and upon those grounds they are
capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately
require demonstration, and demand certainty, where probability only is
to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments. If
we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all
things, we shall do much—what as wisely as he who would not use his
legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly.
6. Knowledge of our Capacity a Cure of Scepticism and Idleness.