An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 — John Locke — John Shaqi
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
John Locke · en
Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the occasion of this
inquiry into human Understanding. But, before I proceed on to what I
have thought on this subject, I must here in the entrance beg pardon of
my reader for the frequent use of the word IDEA, which he will find in
the following treatise. It being that term which, I think, serves best
to stand for whatsoever is the OBJECT of the understanding when a man
thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by PHANTASM,
NOTION, SPECIES, or WHATEVER IT IS WHICH THE MIND CAN BE EMPLOYED ABOUT
IN THINKING; and I could not avoid frequently using it. I presume it
will be easily granted me, that there are such IDEAS in men’s minds:
every one is conscious of them in himself; and men’s words and actions
will satisfy him that they are in others.
Our first inquiry then shall be,—how they come into the mind.
CHAPTER II.
NO INNATE SPECULATIVE PRINCIPLES.
1. The way shown how we come by any Knowledge, sufficient to prove it
not innate.
It is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the
understanding certain INNATE PRINCIPLES; some primary notions, Κοινὰι
εὔνοιαι, characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of man; which the
soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with
it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the
falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I hope I shall
in the following parts of this Discourse) how men, barely by the use of
their natural faculties may attain to all the knowledge they have,
without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at
certainty, without any such original notions or principles. For I
imagine any one will easily grant that it would be impertinent to
suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom God hath
given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes from external
objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several
truths to the impressions of nature, and innate characters, when we may
observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain
knowledge of them as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.
But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own
thoughts in the search of truth, when they lead him ever so little out
of the common road, I shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of
the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one;
which I leave to be considered by those who, with me, dispose
themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.
2. General Assent the great Argument.