An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 — John Locke — John Shaqi
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
John Locke · en
and fire stand for them; yet it will be some years after, perhaps,
before the same child will assent to this proposition, “That it is
impossible for the same thing to be and not to be”; because that,
though perhaps the words are as easy to be learnt, yet the
signification of them being more large, comprehensive, and abstract
than of the names annexed to those sensible things the child hath to do
with, it is longer before he learns their precise meaning, and it
requires more time plainly to form in his mind those general ideas they
stand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any
child assent to a proposition made up of such general terms; but as
soon as ever he has got those ideas, and learned their names, he
forwardly closes with the one as well as the other of the forementioned
propositions: and with both for the same reason; viz. because he finds
the ideas he has in his mind to agree or disagree, according as the
words standing for them are affirmed or denied one of another in the
proposition. But if propositions be brought to him in words which stand
for ideas he has not yet in his mind, to such propositions, however
evidently true or false in themselves, he affords neither assent nor
dissent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty sounds, any further
than they are signs of our ideas, we cannot but assent to them as they
correspond to those ideas we have, but no further than that. But the
showing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds; and the
grounds of several degrees of assent, being; the business of the
following Discourse, it may suffice to have only touched on it here, as
one reason that made me doubt of those innate principles.
24. Not innate because not universally assented to.
To conclude this argument of universal consent, I agree with these
defenders of innate principles,—that if they are innate, they must
needs have universal assent. For that a truth should be innate and yet
not assented to, is to me as unintelligible as for a man to know a
truth and be ignorant of it at the same time. But then, by these men’s
own confession, they cannot be innate; since they are not assented to
by those who understand not the terms; nor by a great part of those who
do understand them, but have yet never heard nor thought of those
propositions; which, I think, is at least one half of mankind. But were
the number far less, it would be enough to destroy universal assent,
and thereby show these propositions not to be innate, if children alone
were ignorant of them.
25. These Maxims not the first known.