An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 — John Locke — John Shaqi
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
John Locke · en
Perhaps it will be urged, that the tacit assent of their minds agrees
to what their practice contradicts. I answer, first, I have always
thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts.
But, since it is certain that most men’s practices, and some men’s open
professions, have either questioned or denied these principles, it is
impossible to establish an universal consent, (though we should look
for it only amongst grown men,) without which it is impossible to
conclude them innate. Secondly, it is very strange and unreasonable to
suppose innate practical principles, that terminate only in
contemplation. Practical principles, derived from nature, are there for
operation, and must produce conformity of action, not barely
speculative assent to their truth, or else they are in vain
distinguished from speculative maxims. Nature, I confess, has put into
man a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery: these indeed are
innate practical principles which (as practical principles ought) DO
continue constantly to operate and influence all our actions without
ceasing: these may be observed in all persons and all ages, steady and
universal; but these are INCLINATIONS OF THE APPETITE to good, not
impressions of truth on the understanding. I deny not that there are
natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men; and that from the
very first instances of sense and perception, there are some things
that are grateful and others unwelcome to them; some things that they
incline to and others that they fly: but this makes nothing for innate
characters on the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge
regulating our practice. Such natural impressions on the understanding
are so far from being confirmed hereby, that this is an argument
against them; since, if there were certain characters imprinted by
nature on the understanding, as the principles of knowledge, we could
not but perceive them constantly operate in us and influence our
knowledge, as we do those others on the will and appetite; which never
cease to be the constant springs and motives of all our actions, to
which we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us.
4. Moral Rules need a Proof, _ergo_ not innate.