An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 — John Locke — John Shaqi
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
John Locke · en
sincerely at truth and usefulness, though in one of the meanest ways.
The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without
master-builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will
leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity: but every one
must not hope to be a Boyle or a Sydenham; and in an age that produces
such masters as the great Huygenius and the incomparable Mr. Newton,
with some others of that strain, it is ambition enough to be employed
as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some
of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge;—which certainly had
been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of
ingenious and industrious men had not been much cumbered with the
learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible
terms, introduced into the sciences, and there made an art of, to that
degree that Philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of
things, was thought unfit or incapable to be brought into well-bred
company and polite conversation. Vague and insignificant forms of
speech, and abuse of language, have so long passed for mysteries of
science; and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning,
have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning
and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either
those who speak or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of
ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge. To break in upon the
sanctuary of vanity and ignorance will be, I suppose, some service to
human understanding; though so few are apt to think they deceive or are
deceived in the use of words; or that the language of the sect they are
of has any faults in it which ought to be examined or corrected, that I
hope I shall be pardoned if I have in the Third Book dwelt long on this
subject, and endeavoured to make it so plain, that neither the
inveterateness of the mischief, nor the prevalency of the fashion,
shall be any excuse for those who will not take care about the meaning
of their own words, and will not suffer the significancy of their
expressions to be inquired into.
I have been told that a short Epitome of this Treatise, which was
printed in 1688, was by some condemned without reading, because INNATE
IDEAS were denied in it; they too hastily concluding, that if innate
ideas were not supposed, there would be little left either of the
notion or proof of spirits. If any one take the like offence at the
entrance of this Treatise, I shall desire him to read it through; and
then I hope he will be convinced, that the taking away false
foundations is not to the prejudice but advantage of truth, which is
never injured or endangered so much as when mixed with, or built on,
falsehood. In the Second Edition I added as followeth:—