An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 2: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 3 and 4
John Locke · en
One thing further, I think, it may not be amiss to observe concerning
these general maxims, That they are so far from improving or
establishing our minds in true knowledge that if our notions be wrong,
loose, or unsteady, and we resign up our thoughts to the sound of words,
rather than [fix them on settled, determined] ideas of things; I say
these general maxims will serve to confirm us in mistakes; and in such
a way of use of words, which is most common, will serve to prove
contradictions: v.g. he that with Descartes shall frame in his mind
an idea of what he calls body to be nothing but extension, may easily
demonstrate that there is no vacuum, i.e. no space void of body, by this
maxim, WHAT IS, IS. For the idea to which he annexes the name body,
being bare extension, his knowledge that space cannot be without
body, is certain. For he knows his own idea of extension clearly and
distinctly, and knows that it is what it is, and not another idea,
though it be called by these three names,--extension, body, space. Which
three words, standing for one and the same idea, may, no doubt, with
the same evidence and certainty be affirmed one of another, as each of
itself: and it is as certain, that, whilst I use them all to stand for
one and the same idea, this predication is as true and identical in its
signification, that 'space is body,' as this predication is true and
identical, that 'body is body,' both in signification and sound.
13. Instance in Vacuum.
But if another should come and make to himself another idea, different
from Descartes's, of the thing, which yet with Descartes he calls by the
same name body, and make his idea, which he expresses by the word body,
to be of a thing that hath both extension and solidity together; he will
as easily demonstrate, that there may be a vacuum or space without a
body, as Descartes demonstrated the contrary. Because the idea to which
he gives the name space being barely the simple one of extension, and
the idea to which he gives the name body being the complex idea of
extension and resistibility or solidity, together in the same
subject, these two ideas are not exactly one and the same, but in the
understanding as distinct as the ideas of one and two, white and black,
or as of CORPOREITY and HUMANITY, if I may use those barbarous terms:
and therefore the predication of them in our minds, or in words standing
for them, is not identical, but the negation of them one of another;
[viz. this proposition: 'Extension or space is not body,' is] as true
and evidently certain as this maxim, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING
TO BE AND NOT TO BE, [can make any proposition.]
14. But they prove not the Existance of things without us.