XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a National Army XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must retain at least the semblance of old ways XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken possession, ought to make everything new XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their citizens than were the Athenians XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until they are forced to yield them XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to temporize with it than to meet it with violence XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves that are pernicious to a State XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the liberties of that Republic XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to ancient usage with stringent retrospective effect XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different Nations XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble XLII. How easily men become corrupted