A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I
John Stuart Mill · en
§ 5. By far the greatest portion of our knowledge, whether of general
truths or of particular facts, being avowedly matter of inference,
nearly the whole, not only of science, but of human conduct, is amenable
to the authority of logic. To draw inferences has been said to be the
great business of life. Every one has daily, hourly, and momentary need
of ascertaining facts which he has not directly observed; not from any
general purpose of adding to his stock of knowledge, but because the
facts themselves are of importance to his interests or to his
occupations. The business of the magistrate, of the military commander,
of the navigator, of the physician, of the agriculturist, is merely to
judge of evidence, and to act accordingly. They all have to ascertain
certain facts, in order that they may afterwards apply certain rules,
either devised by themselves, or prescribed for their guidance by
others; and as they do this well or ill, so they discharge well or ill
the duties of their several callings. It is the only occupation in
which the mind never ceases to be engaged; and is the subject, not of
logic, but of knowledge in general.
Logic, however, is not the same thing with knowledge, though the field
of logic is coextensive with the field of knowledge. Logic is the common
judge and arbiter of all particular investigations. It does not
undertake to find evidence, but to determine whether it has been found.
Logic neither observes, nor invents, nor discovers; but judges. It is no
part of the business of logic to inform the surgeon what appearances are
found to accompany a violent death. This he must learn from his own
experience and observation, or from that of others, his predecessors in
his peculiar pursuit. But logic sits in judgment on the sufficiency of
that observation and experience to justify his rules, and on the
sufficiency of his rules to justify his conduct. It does not give him
proofs, but teaches him what makes them proofs, and how he is to judge
of them. It does not teach that any particular fact proves any other,
but points out to what conditions all facts must conform, in order that
they may prove other facts. To decide whether any given fact fulfils
these conditions, or whether facts can be found which fulfil them in a
given case, belongs exclusively to the particular art or science, or to
our knowledge of the particular subject.