A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I
John Stuart Mill · en
[4] The view taken in the text, of the definition and purpose of Logic,
stands in marked opposition to that of the school of philosophy which,
in this country, is represented by the writings of Sir William Hamilton
and of his numerous pupils. Logic, as this school conceives it, is "the
Science of the Formal Laws of Thought;" a definition framed for the
express purpose of excluding, as irrelevant to Logic, whatever relates
to Belief and Disbelief, or to the pursuit of truth as such, and
restricting the science to that very limited portion of its total
province, which has reference to the conditions, not of Truth, but of
Consistency. What I have thought it useful to say in opposition to this
limitation of the field of Logic, has been said at some length in a
separate work, first published in 1865, and entitled _An Examination of
Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the Principal Philosophical
Questions discussed in his Writings_. For the purposes of the present
Treatise, I am content that the justification of the larger extension
which I give to the domain of the science, should rest on the sequel of
the Treatise itself. Some remarks on the relation which the Logic of
Consistency bears to the Logic of Truth, and on the place which that
particular part occupies in the whole to which it belongs, will be found
in the present volume (Book II. chap. iii. § 9).
BOOK I.
OF NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS.
'La scolastique, qui produisit dans la logique, comme dans la morale,
et dans une partie de la métaphysique, une subtilité, une précision
d'idées, dont l'habitude inconnue aux anciens, a contribué plus qu'on ne
croit au progrès de la bonne philosophie.'--CONDORCET, _Vie de Turgot_.
'To the schoolmen the vulgar languages are principally indebted for what
precision and analytic subtlety they possess.'--SIR W. HAMILTON,
_Discussions in Philosophy_.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE NECESSITY OF COMMENCING WITH AN ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE.
§ 1. It is so much the established practice of writers on logic to
commence their treatises by a few general observations (in most cases,
it is true, rather meagre) on Terms and their varieties, that it will,
perhaps, scarcely be required from me in merely following the common
usage, to be as particular in assigning my reasons, as it is usually
expected that those should be who deviate from it.