A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I
John Stuart Mill · en
Every proposition consists of three parts: the Subject, the Predicate,
and the Copula. The predicate is the name denoting that which is
affirmed or denied. The subject is the name denoting the person or thing
which something is affirmed or denied of. The copula is the sign
denoting that there is an affirmation or denial; and thereby enabling
the hearer or reader to distinguish a proposition from any other kind of
discourse. Thus, in the proposition, The earth is round, the Predicate
is the word _round_, which denotes the quality affirmed, or (as the
phrase is) predicated: _the earth_, words denoting the object which that
quality is affirmed of, compose the Subject; the word _is_, which serves
as the connecting mark between the subject and predicate, to show that
one of them is affirmed of the other, is called the Copula.
Dismissing, for the present, the copula, of which more will be said
hereafter, every proposition, then, consists of at least two names;
brings together two names, in a particular manner. This is already a
first step towards what we are in quest of. It appears from this, that
for an act of belief, _one_ object is not sufficient; the simplest act
of belief supposes, and has something to do with, _two_ objects: two
names, to say the least; and (since the names must be names of
something) two _nameable things_. A large class of thinkers would cut
the matter short by saying, two _ideas_. They would say, that the
subject and predicate are both of them names of ideas; the idea of gold,
for instance, and the idea of yellow; and that what takes place (or part
of what takes place) in the act of belief, consists in bringing (as it
is often expressed) one of these ideas under the other. But this we are
not yet in a condition to say: whether such be the correct mode of
describing the phenomenon, is an after consideration. The result with
which for the present we must be contented, is, that in every act of
belief _two_ objects are in some manner taken cognizance of; that there
can be no belief claimed, or question propounded, which does not embrace
two distinct (either material or intellectual) subjects of thought; each
of them capable, or not, of being conceived by itself, but incapable of
being believed by itself.