A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I
John Stuart Mill · en
Complex uniformities which, like this, are mere cases of simpler ones,
and have, therefore, been virtually affirmed in affirming those, may
with propriety be called _laws_, but can scarcely, in the strictness of
scientific speech, be termed Laws of Nature. It is the custom in
science, wherever regularity of any kind can be traced, to call the
general proposition which expresses the nature of that regularity, a
law; as when, in mathematics, we speak of the law of decrease of the
successive terms of a converging series. But the expression _law of
nature_ has generally been employed with a sort of tacit reference to
the original sense of the word law, namely, the expression of the will
of a superior. When, therefore, it appeared that any of the uniformities
which were observed in nature, would result spontaneously from certain
other uniformities, no separate act of creative will being supposed
necessary for the production of the derivative uniformities, these have
not usually been spoken of as laws of nature. According to one mode of
expression, the question, What are the laws of nature? may be stated
thus:--What are the fewest and simplest assumptions, which being
granted, the whole existing order of nature would result? Another mode
of stating it would be thus: What are the fewest general propositions
from which all the uniformities which exist in the universe might be
deductively inferred?
Every great advance which marks an epoch in the progress of science, has
consisted in a step made towards the solution of this problem. Even a
simple colligation of inductions already made, without any fresh
extension of the inductive inference, is already an advance in that
direction. When Kepler expressed the regularity which exists in the
observed motions of the heavenly bodies, by the three general
propositions called his laws, he, in so doing, pointed out three simple
suppositions which, instead of a much greater number, would suffice to
construct the whole scheme of the heavenly motions, so far as it was
known up to that time. A similar and still greater step was made when
these laws, which at first did not seem to be included in any more
general truths, were discovered to be cases of the three laws of motion,
as obtaining among bodies which mutually tend towards one another with a
certain force, and have had a certain instantaneous impulse originally
impressed upon them. After this great discovery, Kepler's three
propositions, though still called laws, would hardly, by any person
accustomed to use language with precision, be termed laws of nature:
that phrase would be reserved for the simpler and more general laws into
which Newton is said to have resolved them.