A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I
John Stuart Mill · en
According to this language, every well-grounded inductive generalization
is either a law of nature, or a result of laws of nature, capable, if
those laws are known, of being predicted from them. And the problem of
Inductive Logic may be summed up in two questions: how to ascertain the
laws of nature; and how, after having ascertained them, to follow them
into their results. On the other hand, we must not suffer ourselves to
imagine that this mode of statement amounts to a real analysis, or to
anything but a mere verbal transformation of the problem; for the
expression, Laws of Nature, _means_ nothing but the uniformities which
exist among natural phenomena (or, in other words, the results of
induction), when reduced to their simplest expression. It is, however,
something to have advanced so far, as to see that the study of nature is
the study of laws, not _a_ law; of uniformities, in the plural number:
that the different natural phenomena have their separate rules or modes
of taking place, which, though much intermixed and entangled with one
another, may, to a certain extent, be studied apart: that (to resume our
former metaphor) the regularity which exists in nature is a web composed
of distinct threads, and only to be understood by tracing each of the
threads separately; for which purpose it is often necessary to unravel
some portion of the web, and exhibit the fibres apart. The rules of
experimental inquiry are the contrivances for unravelling the web.
§ 2. In thus attempting to ascertain the general order of nature by
ascertaining the particular order of the occurrence of each one of the
phenomena of nature, the most scientific proceeding can be no more than
an improved form of that which was primitively pursued by the human
understanding, while undirected by science. When mankind first formed
the idea of studying phenomena according to a stricter and surer method
than that which they had in the first instance spontaneously adopted,
they did not, conformably to the well-meant but impracticable precept of
Descartes, set out from the supposition that nothing had been already
ascertained. Many of the uniformities existing among phenomena are so
constant, and so open to observation, as to force themselves upon
involuntary recognition. Some facts are so perpetually and familiarly
accompanied by certain others, that mankind learnt, as children learn,
to expect the one where they found the other, long before they knew how
to put their expectation into words by asserting, in a proposition, the
existence of a connexion between those phenomena. No science was needed
to teach that food nourishes, that water drowns, or quenches thirst,
that the sun gives light and heat, that bodies fall to the ground. The
first scientific inquirers assumed these and the like as known truths,
and set out from them to discover others which were unknown: nor were
they wrong in so doing, subject, however, as they afterwards began to