A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. I
John Stuart Mill · en
The necessity of an enumeration of Existences, as the basis of Logic,
did not escape the attention of the schoolmen, and of their master
Aristotle, the most comprehensive, if not also the most sagacious, of
the ancient philosophers. The Categories, or Predicaments--the former a
Greek word, the latter its literal translation in the Latin
language--were intended by him and his followers as an enumeration of
all things capable of being named; an enumeration by the _summa
genera_, _i.e._ the most extensive classes into which things could be
distributed; which, therefore, were so many highest Predicates, one or
other of which was supposed capable of being affirmed with truth of
every nameable thing whatsoever. The following are the classes into
which, according to this school of philosophy, Things in general might
be reduced:--
Οὐσία, Substantia.
Ποσὸν, Quantitas.
Ποιόν, Qualitas.
Πρός τι, Relatio.
Ποιεῖν, Actio.
Πάσχειν, Passio.
Ποῦ, Ubi.
Πότε, Quando.
Κεῖσθαι, Situs.
Ἔχειν, Habitus.
The imperfections of this classification are too obvious to require, and
its merits are not sufficient to reward, a minute examination. It is a
mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked out by the language of
familiar life, with little or no attempt to penetrate, by philosophic
analysis, to the _rationale_ even of those common distinctions. Such an
analysis, however superficially conducted, would have shown the
enumeration to be both redundant and defective. Some objects are
omitted, and others repeated several times under different heads. It is
like a division of animals into men, quadrupeds, horses, asses, and
ponies. That, for instance, could not be a very comprehensive view of
the nature of Relation which could exclude action, passivity, and local
situation from that category. The same observation applies to the
categories Quando (or position in time), and Ubi (or position in space);
while the distinction between the latter and Situs is merely verbal. The
incongruity of erecting into a _summum genus_ the class which forms the
tenth category is manifest. On the other hand, the enumeration takes no
notice of anything besides substances and attributes. In what category
are we to place sensations, or any other feelings and states of mind; as
hope, joy, fear; sound, smell, taste; pain, pleasure; thought, judgment,
conception, and the like? Probably all these would have been placed by
the Aristotelian school in the categories of _actio_ and _passio_; and
the relation of such of them as are active, to their objects, and of
such of them as are passive, to their causes, would rightly be so
placed; but the things themselves, the feelings or states of mind,
wrongly. Feelings, or states of consciousness, are assuredly to be
counted among realities, but they cannot be reckoned either among
substances or attributes.