A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
For these reasons, it requires much more evidence to establish an
exception to one of the more general empirical laws than to the more
special ones. We should not have any difficulty in believing that there
might be a new Kind of crow; or a new kind of bird resembling a crow in
the properties hitherto considered distinctive of that Kind. But it
would require stronger proof to convince us of the existence of a Kind
of crow having properties at variance with any generally recognised
universal property of birds; and a still higher degree if the properties
conflict with any recognised universal property of animals. And this is
conformable to the mode of judgment recommended by the common sense and
general practice of mankind, who are more incredulous as to any
novelties in nature, according to the degree of generality of the
experience which these novelties seem to contradict.
§ 9. Still, however, even these greater generalizations, which embrace
comprehensive Kinds, containing under them a great number and variety of
_infimæ species_, are only empirical laws, resting on induction by
simple enumeration merely, and not on any process of elimination, a
process wholly inapplicable to this sort of case. Such generalizations,
therefore, ought to be grounded on an examination of all the _infimæ
species_ comprehended in them, and not of a portion only. We cannot
conclude (where causation is not concerned), because a proposition is
true of a number of things resembling one another only in being animals,
that it is therefore true of all animals. If, indeed, anything be true
of species which differ more from one another than either differs from a
third, (especially if that third species occupies in most of its known
properties a position between the two former,) there is some probability
that the same thing will also be true of that intermediate species; for
it is often, though by no means universally, found, that there is a sort
of parallelism in the properties of different Kinds, and that their
degree of unlikeness in one respect bears some proportion to their
unlikeness in others. We see this parallelism in the properties of the
different metals; in those of sulphur, phosphorus, and carbon; of
chlorine, iodine, and bromine; in the natural orders of plants and
animals, &c. But there are innumerable anomalies and exceptions to this
sort of conformity; if indeed the conformity itself be anything but an
anomaly and an exception in nature.