A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
§ 3. If, in the simplest observation, or in what passes for such, there
is a large part which is not observation but something else; so in the
simplest description of an observation, there is, and must always be,
much more asserted than is contained in the perception itself. We cannot
describe a fact, without implying more than the fact. The perception is
only of one individual thing; but to describe it is to affirm a
connexion between it and every other thing which is either denoted or
connoted by any of the terms used. To begin with an example, than which
none can be conceived more elementary: I have a sensation of sight, and
I endeavour to describe it by saying that I see something white. In
saying this, I do not solely affirm my sensation; I also class it. I
assert a resemblance between the thing I see, and all things which I and
others are accustomed to call white. I assert that it resembles them in
the circumstance in which they all resemble one another, in that which
is the ground of their being called by the name. This is not merely one
way of describing an observation, but the only way. If I would either
register my observation for my own future use, or make it known for the
benefit of others, I must assert a resemblance between the fact which I
have observed and something else. It is inherent in a description, to be
the statement of a resemblance, or resemblances.
We thus see that it is impossible to express in words any result of
observation, without performing an act possessing what Dr. Whewell
considers to be characteristic of Induction. There is always something
introduced which was not included in the observation itself; some
conception common to the phenomenon with other phenomena to which it is
compared. An observation cannot be spoken of in language at all without
declaring more than that one observation; without assimilating it to
other phenomena already observed and classified. But this identification
of an object--this recognition of it as possessing certain known
characteristics--has never been confounded with Induction. It is an
operation which precedes all induction, and supplies it with its
materials. It is a perception of resemblances, obtained by comparison.