A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
These resemblances are not always apprehended directly, by merely
comparing the object observed with some other present object, or with
our recollection of an object which is absent. They are often
ascertained through intermediate marks, that is, deductively. In
describing some new kind of animal, suppose me to say that it measures
ten feet in length, from the forehead to the extremity of the tail. I
did not ascertain this by the unassisted eye. I had a two-foot rule
which I applied to the object, and, as we commonly say, measured it; an
operation which was not wholly manual, but partly also mathematical,
involving the two propositions, Five times two is ten, and Things which
are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. Hence, the fact
that the animal is ten feet long is not an immediate perception, but a
conclusion from reasoning; the minor premises alone being furnished by
observation of the object. Nevertheless, this is called an observation
or a description of the animal, not an induction respecting it.
To pass at once from a very simple to a very complex example: I affirm
that the earth is globular. The assertion is not grounded on direct
perception; for the figure of the earth cannot, by us, be directly
perceived, though the assertion would not be true unless circumstances
could be supposed under which its truth could be so perceived. That the
form of the earth is globular is inferred from certain marks, as for
instance from this, that its shadow thrown upon the moon is circular; or
this, that on the sea, or any extensive plain, our horizon is always a
circle; either of which marks is incompatible with any other than a
globular form. I assert further, that the earth is that particular kind
of globe which is termed an oblate spheroid; because it is found by
measurement in the direction of the meridian, that the length on the
surface of the earth which subtends a given angle at its centre,
diminishes as we recede from the equator and approach the poles. But
these propositions, that the earth is globular, and that it is an oblate
spheroid, assert, each of them, an individual fact; in its own nature
capable of being perceived by the senses when the requisite organs and
the necessary position are supposed, and only not actually perceived
because those organs and that position are wanting. This identification
of the earth, first as a globe, and next as an oblate spheroid, which,
if the fact could have been seen, would have been called a description
of the figure of the earth, may without impropriety be so called when,
instead of being seen, it is inferred. But we could not without
impropriety call either of these assertions an induction from facts
respecting the earth. They are not general propositions collected from
particular facts, but particular facts deduced from general
propositions. They are conclusions obtained deductively, from premises
originating in induction: but of these premises some were not obtained