A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
Aristotle, philosophizing on the subject of motion, remarked that
certain motions apparently take place spontaneously; bodies fall to the
ground, flame ascends, bubbles of air rise in water, &c.: and these he
called natural motions; while others not only never take place without
external incitement, but even when such incitement is applied, tend
spontaneously to cease; which, to distinguish them from the former, he
called violent motions. Now, in comparing the so-called natural motions
with one another, it appeared to Aristotle that they agreed in one
circumstance, namely, that the body which moved (or seemed to move)
spontaneously, was moving _towards its own place_; meaning thereby the
place from whence it originally came, or the place where a great
quantity of matter similar to itself was assembled. In the other class
of motions, as when bodies are thrown up in the air, they are, on the
contrary, moving _from_ their own place. Now, this conception of a body
moving towards its own place may justly be considered inappropriate;
because, though it expresses a circumstance really found in some of the
most familiar instances of motion apparently spontaneous, yet, first,
there are many other cases of such motion, in which that circumstance is
absent: the motion, for instance, of the earth and planets. Secondly,
even when it is present, the motion, on closer examination, would often
be seen not to be spontaneous: as, when air rises in water, it does not
rise by its own nature, but is pushed up by the superior weight of the
water which presses upon it. Finally, there are many cases in which the
spontaneous motion takes place in the contrary direction to what the
theory considers as the body's own place; for instance, when a fog rises
from a lake, or when water dries up. The agreement, therefore, which
Aristotle selected as his principle of classification, did not extend to
all cases of the phenomenon he wanted to study, spontaneous motion;
while it did include cases of the absence of the phenomenon, cases of
motion not spontaneous. The conception was hence "inappropriate." We may
add that, in the case in question, no conception would be appropriate;
there is no agreement which runs through all the cases of spontaneous or
apparently spontaneous motion and no others: they cannot be brought
under one law: it is a case of Plurality of Causes.[4]