3. A general conception, originally the result of a comparison, becomes itself the type of comparison 198 4. What is meant by appropriate conceptions 200 5. --and by clear conceptions 203 6. Further illustration of the subject 205 CHAPTER III. _Of Naming, as subsidiary to Induction._ § 1. The fundamental property of names as an instrument of thought 209 2. Names are not indispensable to induction 210 3. In what manner subservient to it 211 4. General names not a mere contrivance to economize the use of language 213 CHAPTER IV. _Of the Requisites of a Philosophical Language, and the Principles of Definition._ § 1. First requisite of philosophical language, a steady and determinate meaning for every general name 215 2. Names in common use have often a loose connotation 215 3. --which the logician should fix, with as little alteration as possible 218 4. Why definition is often a question not of words but of things 220 5. How the logician should deal with the transitive applications of words 224 6. Evil consequences of casting off any portion of the customary connotation of words 229 CHAPTER V. _On the Natural History of the Variations in the Meaning of Terms._ § 1. How circumstances originally accidental become incorporated into the meaning of words 236 2. --and sometimes become the whole meaning 238 3. Tendency of words to become generalized 240 4. --and to become specialized 243 CHAPTER VI. _The Principles of a Philosophical Language further considered._ § 1. Second requisite of philosophical language, a name for every important meaning 248 2. --viz. first, an accurate descriptive terminology 248 3. --secondly, a name for each of the more important results of scientific abstraction 252 4. --thirdly, a nomenclature, or system of the names of Kinds 255 5. Peculiar nature of the connotation of names which belong to a nomenclature 257 6. In what cases language may, and may not, be used mechanically 259