A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
§ 3. Since the value of an analogical argument inferring one resemblance
from other resemblances without any antecedent evidence of a connexion
between them, depends on the extent of ascertained resemblance, compared
first with the amount of ascertained difference, and next with the
extent of the unexplored region of unascertained properties; it follows
that where the resemblance is very great, the ascertained difference
very small, and our knowledge of the subject-matter tolerably extensive,
the argument from analogy may approach in strength very near to a valid
induction. If, after much observation of B, we find that it agrees with
A in nine out of ten of its known properties, we may conclude with a
probability of nine to one, that it will possess any given derivative
property of A. If we discover, for example, an unknown animal or plant,
resembling closely some known one in the greater number of the
properties we observe in it, but differing in some few, we may
reasonably expect to find in the unobserved remainder of its properties,
a general agreement with those of the former; but also a difference
corresponding proportionately to the amount of observed diversity.
It thus appears that the conclusions derived from analogy are only of
any considerable value, when the case to which we reason is an adjacent
case; adjacent, not as before, in place or time, but in circumstances.
In the case of effects of which the causes are imperfectly or not at all
known, when consequently the observed order of their occurrence amounts
only to an empirical law, it often happens that the conditions which
have coexisted whenever the effect was observed, have been very
numerous. Now if a new case presents itself, in which all these
conditions do not exist, but the far greater part of them do, some one
or a few only being wanting, the inference that the effect will occur,
notwithstanding this deficiency of complete resemblance to the cases in
which it has been observed, may, though of the nature of analogy,
possess a high degree of probability. It is hardly necessary to add
that, however considerable this probability may be, no competent
inquirer into nature will rest satisfied with it when a complete
induction is attainable; but will consider the analogy as a mere
guide-post, pointing out the direction in which more rigorous
investigations should be prosecuted.