A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
§ 3. There are, therefore, only two kinds of propositions which assert
uniformity of coexistence between properties. Either the properties
depend on causes, or they do not. If they do, the proposition which
affirms them to be coexistent is a derivative law of coexistence between
effects, and until resolved into the laws of causation on which it
depends, is an empirical law, and to be tried by the principles of
induction to which such laws are amenable. If, on the other hand, the
properties do not depend on causes, but are ultimate properties; then if
it be true that they invariably coexist, they must all be ultimate
properties of one and the same Kind; and it is of these only that the
coexistences can be classed as a peculiar sort of laws of nature.
When we affirm that all crows are black, or that all negroes have woolly
hair, we assert an uniformity of coexistence. We assert that the
property of blackness, or of having woolly hair, invariably coexists
with the properties which, in common language, or in the scientific
classification that we adopt, are taken to constitute the class crow, or
the class negro. Now, supposing blackness to be an ultimate property of
black objects, or woolly hair an ultimate property of the animals which
possess it; supposing that these properties are not results of
causation, are not connected with antecedent phenomena by any law; then
if all crows are black, and all negroes have woolly hair, these must be
ultimate properties of the Kind _crow_, or _negro_, or of some Kind
which includes them. If, on the contrary, blackness or woolly hair be an
effect depending on causes, these general propositions are manifestly
empirical laws; and all that has already been said respecting that class
of generalizations may be applied without modification to these.
Now, we have seen that in the case of all compounds--of all things, in
short, except the elementary substances and primary powers of
nature--the presumption is, that the properties do really depend upon
causes; and it is impossible in any case whatever to be certain that
they do not. We therefore should not be safe in claiming for any
generalization respecting the coexistence of properties, a degree of
certainty to which, if the properties should happen to be the result of
causes, it would have no claim. A generalization respecting coexistence,
or in other words respecting the properties of Kinds, may be an ultimate
truth, but it may, also, be merely a derivative one; and since, if so,
it is one of those derivative laws which are neither laws of causation,
nor have been resolved into the laws of causation on which they depend,
it can possess no higher degree of evidence than belongs to an empirical
law.