A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
John Stuart Mill · en
§ 4. This conclusion will be confirmed by the consideration of one
great deficiency, which precludes the application to the ultimate
uniformities of coexistence, of a system of rigorous scientific
induction, such as the uniformities in the succession of phenomena have
been found to admit of. The basis of such a system is wanting: there is
no general axiom, standing in the same relation to the uniformities of
coexistence as the law of causation does to those of succession. The
Methods of Induction applicable to the ascertainment of causes and
effects, are grounded on the principle that everything which has a
beginning must have some cause or other; that among the circumstances
which actually existed at the time of its commencement, there is
certainly some one combination, on which the effect in question is
unconditionally consequent, and on the repetition of which it would
certainly again recur. But in an inquiry whether some kind (as crow)
universally possesses a certain property (as blackness), there is no
room for any assumption analogous to this. We have no previous certainty
that the property must have something which constantly coexists with it;
must have an invariable coexistent, in the same manner as an event must
have an invariable antecedent. When we feel pain, we must be in some
circumstances under which if exactly repeated we should always feel
pain. But when we are conscious of blackness, it does not follow that
there is something else present of which blackness is a constant
accompaniment. There is, therefore, no room for elimination; no Method
of Agreement or Difference, or of Concomitant Variations (which is but a
modification either of the Method of Agreement or of the Method of
Difference). We cannot conclude that the blackness we see in crows must
be an invariable property of crows, merely because there is nothing else
present of which it can be an invariable property. We therefore inquire
into the truth of a proposition like "All crows are black," under the
same disadvantage as if, in our inquiries into causation, we were
compelled to let in, as one of the possibilities, that the effect may in
that particular instance have arisen without any cause at all.