Analysis of Mr. Mill's System of Logic — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
Analysis of Mr. Mill's System of Logic
John Stuart Mill · en
It was the attempt to combine the nominalist view of the signification
of general terms with the retention of the dictum as the basis of all
reasoning, that led to the self-contradictory theories disguised under
the ultra-nominalism of Hobbes and Condillac, the ontology of the later
Kantians, and (in a less degree) the abstract ideas of Locke. It was
fancied that the process of inferring new truths was only the
substitution of one arbitrary sign for another; and Condillac even
described science as _une langue bien faite_. But language merely
enables us to remember and impart our thoughts; it strengthens, like an
artificial memory, our power of thought, and is thought's powerful
instrument, but not its exclusive subject. If, indeed, propositions in a
syllogism did nothing but refer something to or exclude it from a class,
then certainly syllogisms might have the dictum for their basis, and
import only that the classification is consistent with itself. But such
is not the primary object of propositions (and it is on this account, as
well as because men will never be persuaded in common discourse to
_quantify_ the predicate, that Mr. De Morgan's or Sir William Hamilton's
_quantification of the predicate_ is a device of little value). What is
asserted in every proposition which conveys real knowledge, is a fact
dependent, not on artificial classification, but on the laws of nature;
and as ratiocination is a mode of gaining real knowledge, the principle
or law of all syllogisms, with propositions not purely verbal, must be,
for affirmative syllogisms, that; Things coexisting with the same thing
coexist with one another; and for negative, that; A thing coexisting
with another, with which a third thing does not coexist, does not
coexist with that third thing. But if (see _suprà_, p. 26) propositions
(and, of course, all combinations of them) be regarded, not
speculatively, as portions of our knowledge of nature, but as memoranda
for practical guidance, to enable us, when we know that a thing has one
of two attributes, to infer it has the other, these two axioms may be
translated into one, viz. Whatever has any mark has that which it is a
mark of; or, if both premisses are universal, Whatever is a mark of any
mark, is a mark of that of which this last is a mark.
CHAPTER III.
THE FUNCTIONS AND LOGICAL VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM.