Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind
John Stuart Mill · en
The imperfections of the language, by which we have to speak of the
phenomena of sight, deserve the greatest attention.
We have an appropriate name for the organ; it is the Eye. And we
have an appropriate name for the Object; it is light. But we have no
appropriate name for the Sensation. From confusion of names,
proceeds confusion of ideas. And from misnaming, on this one point,
not a little unprofitable discourse on the subject of the human mind
has been derived.
The word sight, in certain phrases, denotes the sensation. If I am
asked, what is the feeling which I have by the eye? I answer, sight.
But sight is also a name of the object. The light of day is said to
be a beautiful sight. And sight is sometimes employed as a name of
the organ. An old man informs us, {23} that his sight is failing,
meaning that his eyes are failing.[5]
[Editor's footnote 5: The example given does not seem to me to prove
that sight is ever employed as a name of the organ. When an old man
says that his sight is failing, he means only that he is less
capable of seeing. His eyes might be failing in some other respect,
when he would not say that his sight was failing. The term "sense of
sight," like sense of hearing or of smell, stands, as it seems to
me, for the capability, without reference to the organ.--_Ed._]
Colour is a name, as well of the object, as of the sensation. It is
most commonly a name of the object. Colour is, properly speaking, a
modification of light, though it is never conceived but as something
spread over a surface; it is, therefore, not the name of light
simply, but the name of three things united, light, surface, and a
certain position of the two. In many cases, however, we have no
other name for the sensation. If I am asked, what feeling I have
when a red light is presented to my eyes, I can only say, the colour
of red; and so of other visual feelings, the colour of green, the
colour of white, and so on.
In the term sense of sight, the same complexity of meaning is
involved which we have observed in the terms sense of smell, and
sense of hearing. When I speak of my sense of sight, as when I speak
of the attraction of the load-stone, I mean to denote an antecedent,
and a consequent; the organ with its object in appropriate position,
the antecedent; the sensation, the consequent. This is merely the
philosophical statement of the fact, that, when light is received
into the eye, the sensation of sight is the consequence.