It was a question much discussed among philosophers in ancient times, whether Pyrrhonism should be considered a philosophical sect or not. Thus we find that Hippobotus in his work entitled [Greek: peri haireseon], written shortly before our era, does not include Pyrrhonism among the other sects.[3] Diogenes himself, after some hesitation remarking that many do not consider it a sect, finally decides to call it so.[4] [1] _Hyp._ I. 5, 6. [2] _Hyp._ I. 7. [3] Diog. _Pro._ 19. [4] Diog. _Pro._ 20. Sextus in discussing this subject calls Scepticism an [Greek: agoge], or a movement, rather than a [Greek: hairesis], saying that Scepticism is not a sect, if that word implies a systematic arrangement of dogmas, for the Sceptic has no dogmas. If, however, a sect may mean simply the following of a certain system of reasoning according to what appears to be true, then Scepticism is a sect.[1] From a quotation given later on by Sextus from Aenesidemus, we know that the latter used the term [Greek: agoge].[2] Sextus gives also the other titles, so well known as having been applied to Scepticism, namely, [Greek: zetetike], [Greek: ephektike], and [Greek: aporetike].[3] The [Greek: dunamis][4] of Scepticism is to oppose the things of sense and intellect in every possible way to each other, and through the equal weight of things opposed, or [Greek: isostheneia], to reach first the state of suspension of judgement, and afterwards ataraxia, or "repose and tranquillity of soul."[5] The purpose of Scepticism is then the hope of ataraxia, and its origin was in the troubled state of mind induced by the inequality of things, and uncertainty in regard to the truth. Therefore, says Sextus, men of the greatest talent began the Sceptical system by placing in opposition to every argument an equal one, thus leading to a philosophical system without a dogma, for the Sceptic claims that he has no dogma.[6] The Sceptic is never supposed to state a decided opinion, but only to say what appears to him. Even the Sceptical formulae, such as "Nothing more,"[7] or "I decide nothing,"[8] or "All is false," include themselves with other things. The only statements that the Sceptic can make, are in regard to his own sensations. He cannot deny that he is warm or cold or hungry. [1] _Hyp._ I. 15, 17. [2] _Hyp._ I. 210. [3] _Hyp._ I. 7; Diog. IX. 11, 70. [4] _Hyp._ I. 8. [5] _Hyp._ I. 10. [6] _Hyp._ I. 12. [7] _Hyp._ I. 14. [8] _Hyp._ I. 14.