Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism
John Stuart Mill · en
_The Third Trope_. The third Trope limits the argument to the
sense-perceptions of one man, a Dogmatic, if preferred, or to
one whom the Dogmatics consider wise,[1] and states that as the
ideas given by the different sense organs differ radically in a
way that does not admit of their being compared with each other,
they furnish no reliable testimony regarding the nature of
objects.[2] "Each of the phenomena perceived by us seems to
present itself in many forms, as the apple, smooth, fragrant
brown and sweet." The apple was evidently the ordinary example
given for this Trope, for Diogenes uses the same, but in a much
more condensed form, and not with equal understanding of the
results to be deduced from it.[3] The consequence of the
incompatibility of the mental representations produced through
the several sense organs by the apple, may be the acceptance of
either of the three following propositions: (i) That only those
qualities exist in the apple which we perceive. (ii) That more
than these exist. (iii) That even those perceived do not
exist.[4] Accordingly, any experience which can give rise to
such different views regarding outward objects, cannot be relied
upon as a testimony concerning them.
[1] _Hyp._ I. 90.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 94.
[3] Diog. IX. 11 81.
[4] _Hyp._ I. 99.
The non-homogeneous nature of the mental images connected with
the different sense organs, as presented by Sextus, reminds us
of the discussion of the same subject by Berkeley in his _Theory
of Vision_.