Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism
John Stuart Mill · en
This explanation, however, makes Sextus a very stupid man.
Aenesidemus' books were well known, and Sextus would most
certainly take the trouble to read them. His reputation as an
historian would not sustain such an accusation, as Diogenes
calls his books [Greek: ta deka ton skeptikon kai alla
kallista].[1] Furthermore, that Sextus used Aenesidemus' own
books we know from the direct quotation from them in regard to
Plato,[2] which he combines with the ideas of Menodotus[3] and
his own.
[1] Diog. IX. 12, 116.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 222.
[3] Following the Greek of Bekker.
Sextus' references to Aenesidemus in connection with Heraclitus
are very numerous, and it is absurd to suppose that he would
have trusted entirely to some one who reported him for authority
on such a subject. Even were it possible that Sextus did not
refer directly to the works of Aenesidemus, which we do not
admit, even then, there had been many writers in the Sceptical
School since the time of Aenesidemus, and they certainly could
not all have misrepresented him. We must remember that Sextus
was at the head of the School, and had access to all of its
literature. His honor would not allow of such a mistake, and if
he had indeed made it, his contemporaries must surely have
discovered it before Diogenes characterised his books as [Greek:
kallista]. Whatever may be said against the accuracy of Sextus
as a general historian of philosophy, especially in regard to
the older schools, he cannot certainly be accused of ignorance
respecting the school of which he was at that time the head.
The opinion of Ritter on this subject is that Aenesidemus must
have been a Dogmatic.[1] Saisset contends[2] that Aenesidemus
really passed from the philosophy of Heraclitus to that of
Pyrrho, and made the statement that Scepticism is the path to
the philosophy of Heraclitus to defend his change of view,
although in his case the change had been just the opposite to
the one he defends. Saisset propounds as a law in the history of
philosophy a fact which he claims to be true, that Scepticism
always follows sensationalism, for which he gives two examples,
Pyrrho, who was first a disciple of Democritus, and Hume, who
was a disciple of Locke It is not necessary to discuss the
absurdity of such a law, which someone has well remarked would
involve an _a priori_ construction of history. There is no
apparent reason for Saisset's conjecture in regard to
Aenesidemus, for it is exactly the opposite of what Sextus has
reported. Strange to say, Saisset himself remarks in another
place that we owe religious respect to any text, and that it
should be the first law of criticism to render this.[3] Such
respect to the text of Sextus, as he himself advocates, puts
Saisset's explanation of the subject under discussion out of the
question.
[1] Ritter, _Op. cit._ p. 280. Book IV.
[2] Saisset, _Op. cit._ p. 206.
[3] Saisset _Op. cit._ p. 206.