Spiritualism and the New Psychology: An Explanation of Spiritualist Phenomena and Beliefs in Terms of Modern Knowledge — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
Spiritualism and the New Psychology: An Explanation of Spiritualist Phenomena and Beliefs in Terms of Modern Knowledge
John Stuart Mill · en
This man would probably have refused such a test as locating a
water-pipe, for his conclusions were based upon conscious reasoning and
he would be incapable of making guesses or picking up indications from
the behaviour of bystanders; therefore in the eyes of the credulous he
would be inferior to the wonder-working dowser.
One repeatedly hears stories of how the dowser has found water when
geologists have failed, but the man who is sufficiently uncritical to
accept the working of the twig as due to some strange 'gift' is likely
to be as credulous in observation and beliefs concerning the rest of the
phenomena.
CHAPTER VI
SUGGESTION
'The power of suggestion' is a plausible explanation of varied
phenomena. By it the feelings of a crowd are swayed, fashions are
spread, mistakes are made, and beliefs are imposed upon the multitude,
and in the production of hypnotic and hysterical manifestation the words
'power of suggestion' and 'personal magnetism' are sufficient
explanation of all things visible and invisible.
'Personal magnetism' and its kindred phrases implying the existence of
some subtle physical force are, except when used figuratively, mere
incoherences, but suggestion is an undoubted cause of certain effects
and we must try to understand the meaning of the word.
McDougall defines suggestion as 'a process of communication resulting in
the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the
absence of logical grounds for its acceptance'.[8]
[Footnote 8: _Social Psychology_, p. 97.]
Our thinking (apart from the observation of cause and effect in the
small affairs of ordinary life) is generally a matter of complexes,
logic being concerned only in rare cases; hence if we use the above
definition the greater part of our accepted propositions owe their
acceptance to suggestion. This is true as regards most of our political,
religious, and social beliefs, and, since children believe what they are
taught chiefly because the teacher says so, there does not seem much
opinion or knowledge of the abstract for which suggestion is not
accountable.
If a suggestion agrees with the complexes already existing in the mind
of the hearer then acceptance is likely to follow; this partly explains
the psychology of crowds and the power of oratory, which appeals to
emotions and prejudice rather than to reason. The knowledge that one's
fellows believe is sufficient to convince the ordinary man, and often
the existence of widespread belief is used as an argument to prove the
truth of a proposition. One recognises this tendency at once in people
of another race and other superstitions. An educated Chinese once
assured me that blood from those nearly related would mix if dropped
into a bowl of water, and drops from the veins of strangers would remain
apart, and that this test was used to decide cases of disputed
relationship. When I showed incredulity my friend assured me, 'It's
true, quite true, every one knows it.'