Spiritualism and the New Psychology: An Explanation of Spiritualist Phenomena and Beliefs in Terms of Modern Knowledge — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
Spiritualism and the New Psychology: An Explanation of Spiritualist Phenomena and Beliefs in Terms of Modern Knowledge
John Stuart Mill · en
There are conditions, such as fatigue or sleep, in which the effort
necessary to examine the truth of a proposition seems too great, and
suggestions are accepted which would be rejected in a state of fuller
consciousness. For example, I was awakened one night, when a hospital
resident, and told that one of my patients was very restless. I could
not remember the man, but asked a few questions about him and ordered a
soporific. Next morning on waking I became aware that I had no such
patient, and on enquiry found that I had been mistaken for another
resident whose slumbers had been undisturbed, thanks to my
suggestibility, for had I been fully awake I should have repudiated any
connection with the case. The confident manner of the messenger
assisted the suggestion, and I like to think that had there been a trick
intentionally played upon me even my sleepy consciousness might have
detected some warning change of tone.
Psychologists regard hypnotic suggestibility as only a further stage of
this sleepy non-resistance, but I see in the former a more active desire
to accept. Though suggestion might be further classified according to
the factors concerned in its acceptance, the class showing 'receptivity'
is the important one for our consideration.
There remains auto-suggestion to be considered; it is as difficult to
define as suggestion, but in the absence of any more precise term it
must be accepted as indicating certain mental processes.
The sensations felt in the arms and hands by the water-diviner or
table-turner are partly the result of auto-suggestion and partly of
muscular contractions, themselves produced by the same cause, and some
of the varied sensations of the hysteric are of similar origin. Creepy
feelings at the mention of snakes, and unpleasant sensations at the
thought of those 'minor horrors of war' that live in undergarments, are
further examples.
As far as the persons concerned are able to judge, the sensations are
often real enough, though it was long before I could believe that a
confirmed hysteric who complained of a severe pain really suffered from
that pain; the description of a water-diviner's sensations, given by
himself and quoted in another chapter, are such that one must believe in
the honesty of the writer.
One might say auto-suggestion arises from the unconscious or from a
dissociated stream of consciousness, and this would make it account for
hallucinations and obsessions, but here we must again take account of
borderline cases. The person who feels a cold shiver at the mention of a
snake cannot tell us precisely to what extent the shiver is due to
conscious thoughts, or whether he feels it just because he must; and the
feeling may be due to what he remembers being told about snakes, in
which case it would not be due to pure auto-suggestion.