The above indicated solution of the case of States non-signatory but Members of the League of Nations appears to be so obvious as to require no special mention in the Protocol. A proposal to make a special mention of the matter was made, but after explanations had been given, the authors withdrew their suggestion, declaring that they would be satisfied with the above reference to the subject. At first sight the difference in the way it is proposed to treat non-signatories non-Members of the League of Nations and non-signatories Members of the League may cause some surprise, for it would seem that the signatory States impose greater obligations on the first category than on the second. This, however, is only an appearance. In reality, the signatory States impose no obligations on either category. They cannot do so because the present Protocol is _res inter alias acta_ for all non-signatory States, whether they are Members of the League of Nations or not. The signatories merely undertake obligations as between themselves as to the manner in which they will behave if one of them becomes involved in a conflict with a third State. But whereas, in possible conflicts with a State non-signatory and non-Member of the League, they are entirely free to take such action as they choose, in conflicts which may arise between them and States non-signatory but Members, like themselves, of the League of Nations, their freedom of action is to some extent circumscribed because both parties are bound by legal obligations arising under the Covenant. {194} 2.--WORK OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE. (_Rapporteur_: M. BENES) SECURITY AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. (_Articles 7 to 9, 11 to 15, 17 and 21 of the Protocol_) 1.--INTRODUCTION. The special work of the Third Committee was to deal with the problem of security (sanctions) and the reduction of armaments. The work required, above all, important political negotiations. While the question of arbitration only required one political decision of principle, namely, the acceptance of compulsory arbitration, and the remainder was principally a matter of drafting--without question an extremely difficult task--of a scheme for the application of such arbitration, the questions of security and disarmament necessitated long and laborious political negotiations; for they involved fundamental interests, questions of vital importance to the States, engagements so far-reaching as radically to change the general situation of the various countries.