The Geneva Protocol — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
The Geneva Protocol
John Stuart Mill · en
Of course, in all cases of a serious decision such as this would be,
the Council is not an outside body "calling" upon Governments to do
something. The words used lead one almost unconsciously to visualize
the Council as a sort of entity like a Court, laying down a rule of
conduct for some one; but this is a false vision; for in any such case
the Council is a group of representatives of Governments agreeing, in
the first instance, as such representatives of their own Governments,
upon a course of action to be taken by those very Governments pursuant
to a treaty obligation. We must think of any such action by the
Council as meaning primarily that the British representative and the
French representative, and so on, agree that the respective countries
which they represent will follow a certain course of action in accord.
If the Council were composed of all the Members of the League, it would
be proper to describe its action under such a provision as this as
being a conference of the parties to the {75} treaty to decide as to
what, if anything, those parties should do, and to come to such
decision unanimously, if any decision is to be reached. It is only as
to the Governments which are not represented on the Council that the
Council "calls" for action; so far as the Governments represented on
the Council are concerned, what they do is to _agree_ upon a course of
action.
In theory, as I have said, the sanctions of the Protocol are no more
than a development of those of Article 16 of the Covenant. The
language of the Protocol indeed, in Article 11, incorporates the
provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant by reference.
No provisions of the Covenant have been more debated since it was
written than those of Article 16. In 1921, various amendments to this
Article of the Covenant were proposed, none of which has gone into
force; and, as mentioned above, the Assembly then adopted various
interpretative resolutions regarding Article 16 which, with the
proposed amendments (one of which was textually modified in 1924), are
_provisionally_ in force.[5]
It is unnecessary to attempt any detailed consideration of the exact
legal effect of Article 16 of the Covenant at the present time in view
of these interpretative resolutions and proposed amendments; in general
they are intended to make the system of the economic blockade more
flexible in its application so far as may be consistent with the
purpose of the first paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant, namely,
to institute a complete economic and financial boycott of an aggressor.