The Geneva Protocol — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
The Geneva Protocol
John Stuart Mill · en
The general character of the Protocol of Geneva is such that separate
defensive agreements between the parties to it lose substantially all
of their former importance. The Protocol itself is, among other
things, a general defensive agreement; and under such an agreement,
faithfully lived up to, substantially the only part that could be
played by separate agreements would be to make more detailed and more
regional, perhaps, in their obligation and execution, the general
obligations binding all signatories.
The possibility of these separate defensive agreements is mentioned in
Article 13 of the Protocol. It is laid down that they must be public;
furthermore, action under them cannot take place until the Council "has
called upon the signatory States to apply sanctions." Finally, there
is a most significant provision which illustrates the relatively
unimportant character of such separate agreements under the
Protocol--any such agreement must remain open to all Members of the
League which desire to accede thereto.
This last mentioned provision takes away every possible idea that such
defensive agreements under the Protocol could be anything like the
former "defensive" alliances. Obviously, a defensive agreement which
is open to any Member of the League is merely a part of the general
agreement; particularly is this so when the performance of the
agreement depends and is conditioned upon the request of the Council.
Indeed, in view of the other provisions of the Protocol, it is very
difficult to see any substantial difference between these so-called
defensive agreements and the undertakings[1] which, by Article 13,
States which are signatory to the Protocol may voluntarily give to the
Council regarding the armed forces which might be used in the
application of the sanctions. I say that the {83} two things are
similar for this reason: if in a given case the Council decides that
the military sanctions are to be applied any Signatory is then
entitled, at least if it chooses, to use the whole of its armed forces
against the aggressor. This being so, the use of a specified portion
of these forces in any given case comes to just the same thing whether
it arises from the general agreement to apply sanctions or from a
particular undertaking with the Council or from a particular agreement
with another Signatory.
We may go to this length in thinking of these defensive agreements
hereafter; in view of the fact that they must be public that any Member
of the League may adhere to them and that they cannot be performed
until the Council of the League says so, there could be in such a paper
no effective provision which would go beyond the engagements under the
Protocol itself.