The History of Duelling. Vol. 2 (of 2) — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
The History of Duelling. Vol. 2 (of 2)
John Stuart Mill · en
Mr. Justice Patteson then charged the jury. He said that, from the facts
proved, it was either a case of the high offence charged, or of no crime
at all. The offence charged was that of murder; and the prisoners were
charged, not with having inflicted the wound of which Dr. Hennis died,
but with having been present at the time when another person inflicted
that wound, aiding and assisting that other person, who was not now in
this country, and therefore could not be tried. Unless it was done with
malice aforethought, the crime of murder was not committed. Now, malice
aforethought was not that of private, individual ill-will towards the
party; but it was the malice the law presumed, when persons went out,
intending to commit an act which was in itself unlawful. The law was
this,—that if a person was so near as to be able to give assistance in
any way to that which was going on, though even at some distance, for
the purpose of giving such assistance, and went there for that purpose,
then he was considered to be aiding and assisting. If a party killed
another in a deliberate duel, he was guilty of murder. Whenever two
persons, in cool blood, met and fought on a preceding quarrel, and one
was killed, the law said the other was guilty of murder; and he could
not help himself by alleging, that the other struck the first blow, or
that it was his intent only to vindicate his reputation: he had engaged
in an act highly unlawful, and must abide the consequences; and not only
the principal, but all persons aiding and assisting, or knowingly
present at any deliberate duel, would be liable to a charge of murder.
Where two persons went out with deadly weapons, tending to produce
death, it was impossible not to see that they must have contemplated the
possibility that death would ensue. The two principals in this case had
had a personal altercation, but the other gentlemen had not. There had
been messages to and fro, and great attempts to prevent a duel. They
would say whether those attempts, and the ultimate arrangements to meet
at Halden, would or not lead them to believe that it took place in the
heat of blood. He confessed he had extreme difficulty in seeing how they
could arrive at such a conclusion; how it could be said, the duel took
place in the heat of passion: if they believed it did not, then it was a
deliberate duel; and if so, the law pronounced it to be murder. He would
say nothing as to whether duelling ought to be tolerated: it was not
tolerated by the law of England.—After detailing the whole of the
evidence, the learned judge adverted to the high characters the parties
had received; which he said was not inconsistent with that sense of
honour, which induced them to go out and render their assistance to two
persons in a deliberate duel. The question was in their hands, and they
would decide according to their consciences.
The jury remained in consultation for a few minutes, and returned a
verdict of “Not guilty.”