The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte. Vol. 2 (of 4) — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte. Vol. 2 (of 4)
John Stuart Mill · en
This was the first bone of contention thrown into that Congress; and
Austria soon began to see that the treaty of Campo Formio was to be
not merely an armistice, but a very short one. Bonaparte had formed
in Italy a legion of five thousand Poles. They were still under arms,
awaiting the event. It was notorious that French agents were fomenting
discontent in both Poland and Hungary. The Army of Italy had carefully
spared the hereditary dominions of the Emperor while hurrying toward
Leoben, and Bonaparte, repressing pillage with relentless severity,
had explained that France made war not with the good people of Europe,
but with their tyrannical dynasties. Even in Carinthia some enthusiasm
for revolutionary principles had been created. Thugut had cleverly
prevented Clarke from entering Vienna, because he feared the presence
of a republican among the inflammable elements of that city. Francis
had refused, on the conclusion of peace, to send a diplomatic agent to
Paris, because he did not wish for reciprocity, and was anxious lest a
French minister, if received at Vienna, might there create such a
focus of revolutionary agitation as existed wherever a French embassy
had been established. But now it was suddenly announced that the
French republic had accredited Bernadotte to his court. The report was
true, instructions having been given that the envoy suggest a
dismemberment of Turkey in lieu of the further indemnity Francis
expected, and ascertain how the reconstruction of Poland would be
regarded. He was to prevent Austria's interference in behalf of Rome,
and to insist on being treated with the same punctilio as had been
shown to the royal ambassadors of France. On the other hand, for the
sake of the radicals among the Fructidorians, he was to be
conciliatory, because it was of vital importance that France should
learn the inner workings of the court of Vienna before war broke out
again, especially if the directors were to forestall Bonaparte's
complete ascendancy. There is not a scintilla of evidence that, as
some have suggested, Barras, Sieyès, or Talleyrand tampered with
Bernadotte. He was still a rude soldier, and not the adroit man of
affairs he afterward became. They could rely upon his making a mess of
his mission, and he did so. In a haughty tone he at once demanded, as
he had been instructed to do, the suppression of the Bourbon orders in
Austria, and likewise the omission from the royal almanac of that
family as reigning sovereigns of France. At the same time he made such
an undue display of the tricolor and the republican cockade as to
arouse all latent antagonisms to the Revolution. These and other
similar indiscretions were successful in agitating the populace to
such a degree that finally the embassy was attacked by a mob.
Thoroughly frightened, and knowing that his mission regarding Poland
and Turkey was in vain, Bernadotte demanded his recall. He returned to
Paris, having, as was expected, brought the relations of France and