[Footnote 3: References: Wuttke: Die Voelkerschlacht bei Leipzig. Aster: Die Schlachten bei Leipzig. Also see works of Hofmann, Naumann, and Doerr.] Plans for Conducting the Retreat -- Napoleon's Health -- Bluecher's Brilliant Idea -- Napoleon under Compulsion -- His Skilful Concentration -- The Battle-field around Leipsic -- The Attack -- Results of the First Day's Fighting -- Attempt to Negotiate -- Napoleon's Apathy -- The Positions of the Third Day -- The Grand Army Defeated -- The Disaster at the Elster Bridge -- Dissolution of the Grand Army. But how should the retreat be conducted? Napoleon's habit of reducing his thoughts to writing for the sake of clearness remained strong upon him to the last, and in the painstaking notes which he made with regard to this important move he outlined two alternatives: to garrison Dresden with two corps, send three to reconnoiter about Chemnitz, and then march, with five and the guard, to attack Schwarzenberg; or else to strengthen Murat, place him between Schwarzenberg and Leipsic, and then advance to drive Bernadotte and Bluecher behind the Elbe. But in winter the frozen Elbe with its flat shores would be no rampart. Both plans were abandoned, and on the seventh orders were issued for a retreat behind the Saale, the precipitous banks of which were a natural fortification. Behind this line of defense he could rest in safety during the winter, with his right at Erfurt and his left at Magdeburg. Dresden must, he concluded, be evacuated. This would deprive the allies of the easy refuge behind the Saxon and Bohemian mountains which they had sought at every onset, but it might leave them complete masters of Saxony. To avoid this he must take one of three courses: either halt behind the Mulde for one blow at the armies of the North and of Silesia, or join Murat for a decisive battle with the Austrian general, or else concentrate at Leipsic, and meet the onset of the united allies, now much stronger than he was.