The Panama Canal: A history and description of the enterprise — John Stuart Mill — John Shaqi
The Panama Canal: A history and description of the enterprise
John Stuart Mill · en
It is not surprising, therefore, that the next telegram sent home by the
revolutionary agents was more cheerful. It consisted of the single word
"esperanzas" (hopes). Dr. Amador now made some efforts to ascertain the
sentiment and intentions of the United States government. He called on
Mr. Hay, the Secretary of State, at the state department. Now it is
obvious that when a gentleman calls at a foreign office and announces
himself as a conspirator against a government with which that office has
friendly relations, the visitor cannot expect much practical help and
sympathy. But the authorities at Washington, whose nerves were raw from
the prolonged struggle with Colombia, would scarcely have been human if
they had not felt a secret joy at a movement which promised such an
ample retribution on Colombia and so easy a settlement of the Panama
problem. Dr. Amador was politely informed that he must pay no more calls
at the department. But he had seen and heard enough to assure him that
the United States would at least remain neutral, and, if the revolution
succeeded, would conclude a canal treaty with the new republic. He felt
that there were two very important conditions to be fulfilled. Firstly,
the revolution must be effected without bloodshed, for public sympathy
in the United States would be alienated by any fighting or violent
disturbance. The conspirators were also not without a certain natural
solicitude for their own skins. Secondly, there must be a brand-new
government ready to take the place of the Colombian administration so
soon as this was abolished.
The scene now changes to the isthmus. The conspirators were inclined at
first to be sceptical about Dr. Amador's report of the probable attitude
of the United States, but on November 2, 1903, the arrival of the
American gunboat _Nashville_ at Colon reassured them. The _Nashville_
had come, as American men-of-war had frequently come in the past to
Colon or Panama, not to take sides with any party in a scrimmage, but
calmly and impartially to maintain order and keep transit open at the
isthmus, in accordance with treaty obligations. The orders to the
_Nashville_, as subsequently to the _Boston_ and the _Dixie_, were
these:--
Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption
threatened by armed force, occupy line of railroad. Prevent
landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either
government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or
other point.[5]
A similar order was sent to Rear-Admiral Glass at Acapulco, who was to
proceed to Panama with the same object.