Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 1: Complete Works, Volume Six — Nietzsche — John Shaqi
Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 1: Complete Works, Volume Six
Nietzsche · en
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF METAPHYSICS.--When the history of the rise
of thought comes to be written, a new light will be thrown on the
following statement of a distinguished logician:--"The primordial
general law of the cognisant subject consists in the inner necessity
of recognising every object in itself in its own nature, as a thing
identical with itself, consequently self-existing and at bottom
remaining ever the same and unchangeable: in short, in recognising
everything as a substance." Even this law, which is here called
"primordial," has evolved: it will some day be shown how gradually this
tendency arises in the lower organisms, how the feeble mole-eyes of
their organisations at first see only the same thing,--;how then, when
the various awakenings of pleasure and displeasure become noticeable,
various substances are gradually distinguished, but each with one
attribute, _i.e._ one single relation to such an organism. The first
step in logic is the judgment,--the nature of which, according to the
decision of the best logicians, consists in belief. At the bottom of
all belief lies _the sensation of the pleasant or the painful_ in
relation to the _sentient subject._ A new third sensation as the result
of two previous single sensations is the judgment in its simplest
form. We organic beings have originally no interest in anything but
its relation to _us_ in connection with pleasure and pain. Between
the moments (the states of feeling) when we become conscious of
this connection, lie moments of rest, of non-feeling; the world and
everything is then without interest for us, we notice no change in it
(as even now a deeply interested person does not notice when any one
passes him). To the plant, things are as a rule tranquil and eternal,
everything like itself. From the period of the lower organisms man
has inherited the belief that _similar things_ exist (this theory
is only contradicted by the matured experience of the most advanced
science). The primordial belief of everything organic from the
beginning is perhaps even this, that all the rest of the world is one
and immovable. The point furthest removed from those early beginnings
of logic is the idea of _Causality,_--indeed we still really think
that all sensations and activities are acts of the free will; when the
sentient individual contemplates himself, he regards every sensation,
every alteration as something _isolated,_ that is to say, unconditioned
and disconnected,--it rises up in us without connection with anything
foregoing or following. We are hungry, but do not originally think that
the organism must be nourished; the feeling seems to make itself felt
_without cause and purpose,_ it isolates itself and regards itself as
arbitrary. Therefore, belief in the freedom of the will is an original
error of everything organic, as old as the existence of the awakenings
of logic in it; the belief in unconditioned substances and similar